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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contributory Negligence-Last Clear Chance-
Stop, Look and Listen
In a recent federal case' the plaintiff was hit by a train at a blind
crossing. He looked and listened, slowing down to five miles per
hour, but did not come to a complete stop because of the position of
the watchman, who was standing to one side across the tracks, look-
ing in the opposite direction. After getting on the tracks the watch-
man suddenly rushed out to stop the plaintiff in such a manner that
he stalled his engine with the train about 500 feet away. I-teld,
judgment for plaintiff reversed. A non-suit should have been
granted, as he failed to stop and thus made chance, not precaution,
his guarantee of safety.
There has been a growing tendency, since the Goodman case,2 to
make failure to stop at a crossing with an obstructed view negligence
Per se.3 Some of the courts so holding have, nevertheless, made an
exception 4 where the railroad has established a means upon which
travelers are, partially, permitted to rely. The presence of a watch-
man does not absolve all duty of care by the traveler5 but it does
require less care, and this situation usually is a question for the jury
as distinguished from the Goodman case. Ipso facto the majority
'fBaltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Shaw, 35 F (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929).
'Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 72
L. ed. 167 (1927). Discussed in: (1928) 3 ALA. L. JouR. 136; (1928) 16 CALIF.
L. REv. 238; (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 250; (1928).3 IND. L. JouR. 478; (1928) 26
MICH L. REv. 582; (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 86; (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rav. 212;
(1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 321; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 532.
'Chicago, G. W. Ry. Co. v. Biwer, 266 Fed. 965 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920);
Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Boyden, 269 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1921), (giving
the Penna. rule, the trial being in that state) ; But cf. Payne v. Shotwell, 273
Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 3rd., 1921). For the state holdings, Koster v. Southern
Pacific R. Co., 78 Cal. 233, 279 Pac. 788 (1929), discussed in (1930) 18
CALIF. L. Rav. 203; Williams v. Iola Electric Ry., 102 Kan. 268, 170 Pac. 397
(1918) ; Crandall v. Hines, 121 Me. 11, 115 Atl. 464 (1921) ; Benner v. Phila-
delphia & R. Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 307, 105 Atl. 283, 2 A. L. R. 759 (1918) ; Beck-
with v. Spokane Internat'l Ry. Co., 120 Wash. 91, 206 Pac. 921 (1922).
'Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Slayton, 29 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928)
Vaca v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 91 Cal. App. 470, 267 Pac. 346 (1928). Contra:
O'Neill v. Reading Co., 296 Pa. 319, 145 Atl. 840 (1929) (Absolute duty to
stop. Open gates and negligence in shutting gates no excuse for failure to
stop) ; cf. Serfas v. Lehigh & N. E. R. Co., 270 Pa. 306, 113 Atl. 370 (1921)
(Rule of law, peremptory, absolute and unbending; jury should never be per-
mitted to pare it away by distinctions and exceptions).
'Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Elvins, 176 Ark. 737, 4 S. W. (2d) 528 (1928);
Moeller v. Missouri Pac. .R. Co., 272 S. W. 990 (Mo. App. 1925). Cf. Landers
v. Erie R. Co., 244 Fed. 72 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; Vascacillas v. Southern Pac.
Co., 247 Fed. 8 (C. C. A., 1918).
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rule,8 which holds that failure to stop must be viewed under the
circumstances, would be unlikely to result in a non-suit in such cases.
North Carolina is in the latter class7 and goes so far as to say that
the presence of a watchman is an assurance of safety and an ample
invitation to cross, upon which the traveler may presume it safe.8
The principal case goes further than the Goodman case and is a vast
extension away from the principle recognizing a traveler's equality
with the railroad at a grade crossing.9
- (1919) 1 A. L. R. 198 and note; (1926) 41 A. L. R. 405, 424; (1908) 11
L. R. A. (N. S.) 963, 967; good discussion of the relative merits in (1921)
21 COL. L. REv. 290; Beckham v. Hines, 279 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) ;
Allen v. B. & M. R. Co., 197 Mass. 298, 83 N. E. 863 (1908) ; Crabtree v. Mis-
souri Pac. R. 86, Neb. 33, 124 N. W. 932 (1910); Dobbs v. West Jersey &
Seashore, R., 78 N. J. L. 679, 75 Atl. 905 (1910) ; Payne v. Brown, 133 Va. 222,
112 S. E. 833 (1922). States with the humanitarian doctrine send it to thejury usually, Zumwalt v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 266 S. W. 717 (Mo. 1924); cf.
Lincks v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 143 La. 445, 78 So. 730 (1918). In two states
contributory negligence cannot be a matter of law by the constitution and it is
always a question for the jury. Pacific Const. Co. v. Cochran, 29 Ariz. 554,
243 Pac. 405 (1926); Oklahoma. Union Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 115 Okl. 146, 242
Pac. 176 (1925).
Hunt v. R. R., 170 N. C. 442, 87 S. E. 210 (1915) ; Dail v. R. R., 176 N. C.
111, 96 S. E. 734 (1918); N. C. Public Laws, c. 148, §6 (1927), ch. 222 §1
(1929) ; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1927) §2621 (48) ; (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rv. 212.
' Shepard v. R. R., 166 N. C. 539, 82 S. E. 872 (1914) ; Goff v. R. R., 179
N. C. 216, 102 S. E. 320 (1920) ; Barber v. R. R., 193 N. C. 691, 138 S. E. 17
(1927) (Where a railroad company maintains a flagman at a crossing, whether
voluntarily, by law, or by custom, the public generally. has a right to presume
that this safeguard will be reasonably maintained and attended to, and in the
absence of knowledge to the contrary, the fact that the flagman is absent from
his post, or, if present, is not giving the warning of danger, is an ample invita-
tion to cross, upon which a traveler familiar with the crossing may rely and
act). Cf. Cooper v. R. R., 140 N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391
(1905) ; Perry v. R. R., 180 N. C. 290, 104 S. E. 673 (1920) (Holdinj that if
failure to stop was caused by breach of duty on part of R. R., in that it failed
to giv;e any notice of the approach of the train, then it could not be said as a
legal conclusion that it was contributory negligence); see Russell v. Carolina
Cent. R. R., 118 N. C. 1098, 24 S. E. 512 (1896) (Duty to stop is the peculiar
province of the jury to pass upon) ; and see Harrison v. R. R. 194 N. C. 656,
140 S. E. 598 (1927) (Rule in Goodman Case is considered just another way of
stating the prudent man theory). For the other states following this cf. Cin-
cinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Prewitt's Adm'r., 203 Ky. 147, 262 S. W. 1
(1924) ; State v. B. & 0. R. Co., 145 At. 611 (Md. 1929) ; Wiggin v. B. & M.
R. Co., 75 N. H. 600, 75 At. 103 (1910) ; Passarello v. West Jersey & S. R.
Co., 98 N. J. L. 790, 121 AtI. 708 (1923) (Failure of flagman to do duty and
give proper warning is prima facie negligence of R. R.); Southern Ry. v.
Stockdon, 106 Va. 693, 56 S. E. 713 (1907). But cf. Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Webb, 90 Ala. 185, 8 So. 518 (1890).
' Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161, 24 L. ed. 403 (1877)
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Rebmann, 285 Fed. 317 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) (Rail-
road's precedence conditioned upon duty to give due and timely warning of
approach. People have equal right to travel on the highways as railroads have
to run trains) : cf. U. S. Director Gen'l. of R. R. v. Zanzinger, 269 Fed. 552 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1920) (Necessity to stop, look and listen is based on reasonable,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the principal case it is submitted that even if the plaintiff was
negligent in going upon the tracks the watchman was subsequently
negligent in stopping him in a dangerous position. The plaintiff by
his negligence had gotten into a perilous position and the watchman
saw him and owed the care of an ordinary prudent man under the
circumstances to extricate the plaintiff and avoid the accident. 10
The plaintiff's negligence, being seen and known, brings this under
the conscious last clear chance doctrine which all the courts recog-
nize in one form or another."
It is submitted that the principal case puts an undue burden upon
the traveler of attracting the watchman's attention to get an invi-
•tation 12 to cross. It is also an encroachment upon the province of
the jury. The railroads's and travelers should be equally encouraged
to increase their diligence and when the railroad is at fault it would
best serve society to spread the loss, through injury or death, by
prudent man under all the circumstances and one of the circumstances is right
to expect a warning from R. R. The presumption is in favor of the traveler as
his safety is involved).
'Van Sickler v. Washington & 0. D. Ry., 142 Va. 857, 128 S. E. 367
(1925) ; McGowan v. Tayman, 144 Va. 358, 132 S. E. 316 (1926).
' (1927) 26 MICHIGAN L. REV. 460; (1927) 1 DAK. L. REV. 51; (1927) 61
AMERICAN L. Rxv. 929. For particularly good discussion of entire subject see
Leon Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause (1927) 6 N. C.
L. REv. 3, 21. This was clearly brought out in the charge to the jury in the
Lower Court. "If the flagman, in the exercise of reasonable care and prudent
judgment, knew or should have known that he could not have stopped Shaw or
that Shaw could not have stopped the automobile in which he was riding, con-
sidering his rate of speed, before getting upon the track, and, if the watchman
in the exercise of that same discretion, prudence and care, knew or should have
known that Shaw could have passed over and thus avoided injury, then it was
the duty of the watchman to permit him to pass, but that permission to pass is
predicated upon the knowledge that he could not stop, in time to avoid running
upon the track." This is usually a question for the jury, Curtis v. R. R., 130
N. C. 437, 41 S. E. 929 (1902), and see (1926), 5 N. C. L. REV. 58, unless the
evidence is so overwhelming that only one inference is possible, Coleman v.
Norfolk & West. Ry. Co., 100 W. Va. 679, 131 S. E. 563 (1926). In the prin-
cipal case there are reasonable doubts. The U. S. Supreme Court and many
state courts have gone so far as to recognize the unconscious last clear chance
where it was defendant's duty to exercise due care to discover the plaintiff's
peril, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Ellzey, 275 U. S. 236, 48 Sup. Ct. 80,
72 L. ed. 259 (1927) ; Haynes v. R. R., 182 N. C. 679, 110 S. E. 56 (1921).
' The court says, "The watchman was there and the sounding of the truck's
horn would have caused him to turn and give the proper signal to come or
wait." Should this responsibility be all placed on the traveler and the railroad
be relieved of all care in picking competent watchmen? Under this rule it
would be nearly impossible to have an accident whereby the Railroad would
have any liability.
' The railroads have used the Goodman Case in posters and thus we see the
railroad's opinion of the decision as involving a shift of responsibility to the
traveler.
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making it an item of the cost of maintenance. This seems more
desirable than the result of the principal case.
HUGH B. CAMPBELL.
Corporations-Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock-
Participation in Past Undistributed Profits
In 1927, the directors of a corporation declared a dividend-the
first since the organization of the corporation in 1915-from profits
which had accumulated over a period of twelve years. The plaintiffs,
owners of non-cumulative preferred stock, sought to enjoin the pay-
ment of this dividend to junior shareholders until the directors had
paid to the plaintiffs preferential dividends alleged to -have been
earned, but not distributed to them, in previous years. A Federal
District Court in New York denied plaintiffs injunctive relief.1 But,
in 1929, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision and held
that the non-declaration of dividends from the profits earned in
previous years made the corporation a dividend debtor to the plain-
tiffs to the extent of their preferential right to share in the corpor-
ation's yearly profits, and that this debt must be paid before dividends
to junior stockholders could be declared.2 Then, in 1930, the Su-
preme Court of the United States overruled the holding of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.3 It decided that, since the profits made in
previous years had been devoted each year to capital improvements
instead of dividends, the non-cumulative, preferred shareholders had
no claim to the past invested profits. The reason given was that "a
common and reasonable" interpretation of the nature of non-cumu-
lative stock gives to its holders the right to share only in the declared
dividends of any given year and precludes any right to share in
undistributed profits earned in past years.
Since the right of any shareholder to participate in the profits of
a corporation is a contract right the nature of which is determined
by the particular type of stock owned by him, 4 a preliminary test in
' Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co., 23 F. (2d) 691 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
'Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co., 30 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
'Wabash Ry. Co. et al. v. Barclay, 50 Sup. Ct. 106 (1930).
'Day v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe, etc. Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302
(1924); Continental Ins. Co. v. Minn., etc. Ry. Co., 290 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923) ; Scott v. Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co., 93 Md. 475, 49 Atl. 327 (1901) ; Elkins
v. Camden, etc. Ry. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 233 (1882). See Note (1929) 14 CORN.
L. Q. 341, 342. "Corporate charters are contracts and preferred stock created
by such charters carries only the iights derived from the charter provisions."
Berle, Non-Cuinulative Preferred Stock (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 358.
